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Abstract
In this work, we present an antenna array-based algorithm to detect GNSS repeater and/or spoofing attacks with an experi-
mental validation. With an array receiver capable of measuring the impinging ranging signals direction of arrival in terms 
of azimuth and elevation, it is possible to estimate the antenna platforms attitude. The fact that this information is computed 
(w.r.t. a reference frame) during the position calculation is used. We propose an algorithm aiming to find the relation between 
both representations. This mapping defines the receiver’s attitude in terms of pitch, roll and yaw angle. The residual of this 
mapping is used to construct a quality metric for the mapping. If a threshold is undershot, spoofing/repeating is indicated. 
The performance is demonstrated using software simulations. To show the capabilities under realistic conditions, a test 
platform is described. It consists of a real-time array receiver and a sampling device enabling post-processing. A maritime 
measurement campaign including two vessels—one acting as receiver and the other acting as transmitter—is portrayed. 
Finally, the real-time and post-processing performance of the algorithm is evaluated.
Keywords Global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) · Maritime navigation · Repeater detection · Spoofer detection · 
Attitude estimation · Antenna array signal processing
1 Introduction
Nowadays, global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) are 
an essential part of many systems in the maritime commu-
nity. The position information provided by the GNSS receiv-
ers is usually fused with other sensors like inertial measure-
ment units (IMUs) or magnetic gyroscopes. The subsystem 
of sensors is subsequently integrated with electronic naviga-
tion charts (ENCs) and/or the automatic identification sys-
tem (AIS), which is mandatory for larger vessels. This way, 
the main positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) unit—
required for ships of a certain class—is formed.
The majority of accidents in the maritime context are 
caused by human error. Recent studies [1, 2] exploited that 
fact. A prominent example for a recent incident, which 
caused heavy public attention, is the Costa Concordia acci-
dent [3]. Misuse of the ship’s navigation system by the cap-
tain was discovered to be the reason. The introduction of 
autonomous and trustworthy semi-autonomous systems can 
very likely prevent such catastrophic events in future. Get-
ting towards reliable systems, the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) specifies and promotes the “e-Naviga-
tion” concept [4]. The goal is to achieve an integration of 
already existing electronic navigation devices.
One key element to implement the “e-Navigation” con-
cept is to get towards a standardization of GNSS receivers’ 
positioning performance requirements in terms of integrity, 
accuracy and availability. Current activities aim to terrestrial 
(differential GNSS) or satellite-based (SBAS) augmentation 
systems in order to match the positioning requirements given 
by different (non-global) standards.
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Studies [5] have been carried out to show the vulner-
ability of GNSS signals in maritime environments. Several 
sea trials have been performed by the General Lighthouse 
Authorities of the United Kingdom and Ireland (GLA) in 
collaboration with the UK Ministry of Defense (MOD). 
These studies aimed at exploiting the effects of jamming 
(i.e. radio frequency interference) on security and safety of 
maritime navigation [6]. An important result of the trials is 
that not only the positioning system is affected by interfer-
ence. Since the positioning is an essential input for many 
different subsystems, many safety-critical applications (i.e., 
digital situation awareness, chart stabilization, digital selec-
tive calling and emergency communication) are affected as 
well.
For several decades, many research groups as well as 
receiver manufacturers have taken efforts to detect and mit-
igate RF interference. Due to the large traveling distance 
(more than 20,000 km) of the electromagnetic wave emit-
ted by the navigation satellites towards the surface of the 
earth, a receiver is vulnerable to even unintentional inter-
ference. Since the transmission power of the satellites is in 
the order of 50 W the received power drops down to some 
femtowatts. This increases the risk for operational outages 
or performance degradation [7]. Systems sharing the same 
frequency band [e.g., aviation Distance Measurement Equip-
ment (DME) for Galileo E5a] or systems operating in differ-
ent bands but emitting harmonics in the GNSS bands [user 
terminals for mobile satellite systems (MSS)] are examples 
for unintentional interferers.
In contrast to that, intentional interference becomes a 
major issue not only in a military context. This is due to 
the almost unlimited availability of (cheap) so-called per-
sonal privacy devices (PPDs). By transmitting a relatively 
high-power signal, GNSS receivers (used for critical infra-
structures) in a wide range are affected and therefore cannot 
deliver positioning (and timing) information anymore [8].
In the light of that, large maritime organizations, such as 
the Lloyd’s [9] register but also the European Global Navi-
gation Satellite Systems Agency (GSA) [10], foresee that 
the field of navigation robustness and cybersecurity will be 
a major challenge and trend for the maritime community in 
the upcoming years.
Operational outages or performance degradation is of 
minor concern, if they are detected. This can be achieved 
by constantly monitoring the relevant spectrum and declare 
the system unhealthy if a radio frequency interference (RFI) 
event was identified.
However, during the last decade a different type of threat 
gained much attention in the GNSS community: the so-
called “spoofing” threat. The ultimate goal of a spoofer is 
not to block but to control a victims receiver’s position (and 
time) measurement without being detected. The threat is not 
only of academic interest, but has also been demonstrated 
in reality. Especially in the maritime context, the authors of 
Ref. [11] have shown the vulnerability of a ship’s navigation 
system by spoofing a luxury yacht. Using the same self-
developed spoofer [12], the research group could demon-
strate, that also unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) [13] and 
critical infrastructures, such as power grids [14], are vulner-
able against spoofing. In addition, several experiments per-
formed under laboratory conditions [15] using signal genera-
tors generating different types of spoofing attacks showed 
the vulnerability of professional aeronautical receivers. Sub-
categories of the threat are so-called repeating (unintentional 
re-radiation) and meaconing (intentional re-radiation). The 
similarity to spoofing is the presence of GNSS-like signals 
at a “victim” receiver’s antenna.
If successful and undetected, the attack may cause major 
damage—not only in a monetary sense, but also to lives. 
Several possible receiver autonomous detection schemes 
have been presented in the literature. For single antenna 
receivers, the detection relies on the behavior of different 
signal parameters which are estimated during regular opera-
tion. Examples are signal power, Doppler frequency offset, 
the PRN code delay and its rates, the shape of the correlation 
function as well as the relation of the signal components 
at different carrier frequencies (see [16, 17] and [18] for 
instance). However, the most advanced protection against 
sophisticated spoofing attacks can be provided by using 
antenna arrays and utilizing signal processing in the spatial 
domain [19–24]. A GNSS receiver with multiple antennas 
is able to estimate the directions of arrival (DoA) of the 
impinging waveforms and therefore to distinguish between 
the authentic and counterfeit signals.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: first a 
system description is introduced, which leads to a mathemat-
ical description of the attitude estimation problem. Based on 
that derivation, a metric for anomaly detection is deduced. 
Combining these two results, an algorithm for joint attitude 
estimation and spoofing/repeater detection is presented. In 
the next chapter, a description of the test platform (including 
the array) is provided. Subsequently, the experimental evalu-
ation as well as the results are presented. Finally, a summary 
and conclusion is provided.
2  Notation
The following notation is used throughout the paper:
– x : Bold face lower case letters denote column vectors.
– X : Bold face capital letters denote matrices.
–  : Calligraphic letters denote sets.
– || : The number of elements contained in a set (cardinal-
ity).
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– (⋅)T : The transpose of a vector or matrix.
– tr(⋅) : The trace (i.e. sum of all diagonal elements) of a 
matrix.
– diag(x) ∶ Creates a quadratic matrix, with the vector x on 
its main diagonal. All other entries are zero.
3  System description
The goal of the architecture is to estimate the attitude 
of an antenna array-based receiver platform w.r.t. an 
east–north–up reference coordinate frame. To make the work 
at hand as self-contained as possible, the analysis performed 
in [22] or [25]1 and later used in Ref. [27] are revisited. The 
corresponding estimation problem as well as a way to solve 
it is presented. The derivation provides deeper insights and 
naturally leads to a detection scheme.
The system’s core is an antenna array-based GNSS 
receiver. Assuming enough degrees of freedom (i.e. anten-
nas), a measurement of the ranging signal’s elevation and 
azimuth is performed in the post-correlation domain, by 
using, for example Unitary ESPRIT [28] (if the geom-
etry and pattern are sufficient to fulfill the assumptions). 
The message decoding and position calculation (PVT) is 
assumed to be available. Figure 1 depicts a block diagram 
of the generic system setup.
s1(1)⋯ sL(n) denote the sampled baseband representation 
of the input signals received by the L elements of the array 
antenna. By measuring the DoA of the incoming ranging 
signals, directional cosines2 pointing from the origin of the 
antenna’s local reference frame towards the source (i.e. the 
satellites) are available. These are denoted by bj ∈ ℝ3 and 
collected in the set  = {bj}j∈J . They are represented in a 
local antenna coordinate system (details can be found in Ref. 
[21]). J denotes the set of the corresponding PRN numbers 
of satellites with available measurements.
Decoding the almanac information allows calculation 
of direction cosines in an east–north–up (ENU) coordinate 
frame. The set is denoted by  = {ai}i∈I . I denotes the set 
of PRN numbers, which are evaluated by the receiver. If it 
is assumed that the almanac information is available for all 
tracked satellites J is a subset of I.
Both coordinate frames are rotated versions of each other. 
The following equation for all pairs K = J ∩ I of available 
measurements and references can be stated:
(1)bk = Rak ∀k ∈ .
The rotation is represented by a rotation matrix R ∈ (3)3 
(special orthogonal group). It contains the information about 
roll, pitch and yaw angle and therefore defines the current 
attitude. This rotation (i.e. attitude) describes the rotation of 
the ENU into the antenna coordinate frame at certain time 
instant when the PVT and DOA estimates are available. It 
therefore is a property of the receiver platform.
3.1  Measurement model
The ephemeris and PVT-based directional cosines {ai}i∈ 
are assumed to be perfectly known. This is justified by 
the large distance between the satellites and the surface 
of the earth (more than 20,000 km), where the receiver is 
expected to be. However, the array-based estimates suffer 
Fig. 1  Block diagram of the generic system setup (taken from [22])
1 Recently also published in [26, Chapter 27], both are using slightly 
different terminologies.
2 Unit vectors.
3 See [29], (n) = {X ∈ ℝn×n|XXT = I ∧ det(X) = 1}
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from imperfections. In Ref. [21] these errors are modeled 
using additive Gaussian noise ( nk ∼ (0, 휎2I) ), yielding:
It should be mentioned, that if the corresponding vectors ak 
and bk are unit vectors and both are rotated versions of each 
other, in a strict sense Eq. (2), cannot hold without further 
restrictions on the noise.
It seems convenient to model these errors using rotation 
matrices as well, since the noise affects the orientation of 
the directional cosines:
A construction of these matrices can be performed by choos-
ing a random rotation axis 흎k and a random angle 훼k for each 
measurement separately.
3.2  Snapshot‑based problem statement
The ultimate goal of the algorithms that we are developing in 
this work is to perform a computation of the rotation matrix 
R (which corresponds to the current attitude) and to detect 
anomalies in the DoA measurements (which could be caused 
by “spoofing” or meaconing).
Using the noise model described in Eq. (3), the following 
set of equations for N = |K| different pairs of measurements 
can be stated:
In the following, B ∈ ℝ3×N and A ∈ ℝ3×N denote matrices 
consisting of the available DoAs in their columns. Follow-
ing the maximum likelihood principle, one is interested to 
minimize the noise of the measurement rotation. Therefore, 
the distance of the noisy versions of b [see Eq. (3)] and the 
unaffected ones bperf
k
 is to be minimized.
Since the noisy rotations are assumed to be independent 
for different unit vectors, a measure g(⋅) for this distance 
is employed for each unit vector. The results are summed 
up, yielding the following cost function for the antennas’ 
attitude:
(2)bk = Rak + nk ∀k ∈ .
(3)
bk = Rk Rak
⏟ ⏟
b
perf
k
∀k ∈ .
(4)
b1 = R1Ra1
⋮
bk = RkRak
⋮
bN = RNRaN .
(5)f (R) =
N∑
k=1
g(Rak − bk)
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
Difference caused by noise
.
Using the squared 퓁2-norm for g(⋅) the following ML-based 
optimization problem can be stated:
Other possible choices for g(⋅) can be found in Ref. [29] by 
constructing the induced norms from the metrics described 
therein. This optimization problem (which was derived 
in this work) is also known as Wahba’s problem (see for 
instance [30]).
3.3  Closed‑form solution
In Ref. [21] an iterative approach was used to solve the prob-
lem stated in Eq. (6). In the following section a closed-form 
solution is derived, allowing further insight in the geometric 
properties and conditioning (i.e. under which conditions a 
solution exists) of the problem.
The side condition R ∈ (3) is a more special case of 
R ∈ (3)4, as (n) ⊂ (n) (i.e. mirroring is allowed for 
the orthogonal group). This implies six equality constraints, 
due to symmetry. Defining S = RRT ∈ Sym(3)5, these read:
Equations (8) and (9) are redundant since sk,l = sl,k . For the 
optimization, this yields six equality constraints. A matrix 
횲 ∈ Sym(3) is used to collect the Lagrangian multipliers. 
By constructing a function h(⋅) [see Eq. (10)], all six equal-
ity constraints are summed up. Setting this sum to zero is 
a more relaxed but still necessary condition compared to 
stating them separately:
The Lagrangian cost function therefore reads:
The standard approach (see [31] for instance) is performed 
by setting the gradient w.r.t R to zero and we get:
(6)R∗ = arg min.
R∈(3)
‖RA − B‖2.
(7)sk,k = 1 ∀ 1 ≤ k ≤ 3,
(8)sk,l = 0 ∀ 1 ≤ k < l ≤ 3,
(9)sk,l = 0 ∀ 1 ≤ l < k ≤ 3.
(10)h(R) ∶= tr(횲(RRT − I)) = 0.
(11)L(R,횲) = ‖RA − B‖2 + tr(횲(RRT − I)).
(12)1
2
∇RL(R,횲) = R(AA
T + 횲) − BAT = 0,
(13)
R(AAT + 횲)
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
lhs
= BAT
⏟ ⏟
∶=C=rhs
.
4 (n) = {X ∈ ℝn×n|XTX = I}.
5 Symmetric, quadratic matrices: Sym(n) = {X ∈ ℝn×n|X = XT}.
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The side condition ( R to be orthogonal) can be used in a 
tricky way to solve for 횲 . The transpose of the right-hand 
side (rhs) of the above equation is multiplied from the left. 
The term containing R cancels out. The remaining term in 
brackets is symmetric (due to the redundancy in 횲 ). The 
result reads:
Combining this result with Eq. (13) yields:
Using a singular value decomposition for C ∶= U횺VT , the 
result can be further simplified. Due to the properties of 
U ∈ (3) and V ∈ (3) the following result can be stated:
To finally solve for R , the matrix 횺 = diag(휎1, 휎2, 휎3) has 
to be further investigated. Without loss of generality, the 
singular values are ordered decreasingly. Three cases can be 
distinguished, since if at least one measurement is available, 
the minimum rank of C is one.
1. All singular values are unequal to 0:
횺 is invertible. The result for R reads:
To ensure that a proper rotation matrix (the constraint 
det(R) = 1 was not taken into account so far) is derived, the 
following “normalization” has to be performed:
2. One singular value is equal to 0:
This corresponds to the case, where the set of {ak}Nk=1 or 
{bk}
N
k=1
 span only two dimensions. Since the goal of the opti-
mization is to rotate one coordinate system onto the other, 
this information is enough, since the missing one is uniquely 
determined. The result for R therefore is the same as in the 
previous case.
3. Two singular values are equal to 0:
This case occurs, if only one direction is present in either 
{ak}
N
k=1
 or {bk}Nk=1 . If more than one measurement is avail-
able, this is very unlikely for a GNSS constellation (almanac 
data). If the measurements however span only one dimen-
sion, an anomaly is very likely, which makes an attitude 
determination impossible.
(14)(AAT + 횲) = (CTC)
1
2 .
(15)R(CTC)
1
2 = C.
(16)RV횺 = U횺.
(17)R� = UVT .
(18)R = Udiag(1, 1, det(UVT ))VT .
4  Anomaly detection
As already mentioned in the previous section, an inspec-
tion of the singular values of C = BAT can be used to detect 
anomalies. Computing the sum of singular values as a metric 
is discussed in this section.
By definition, directional cosines have length one. This 
implies, that the sum of all singular values (of C6) is equal 
to N = |K| = |I ∩ J| . This property is used for inspection.
For noisy measurements, the normalized (divided by N) 
sum can be computed, yielding values in the interval [0, 1] . If 
the resulting metric is below a certain threshold 휖 an anom-
aly is very likely. Figure 2 shows an example with moderate 
noise based on computer simulations. For all simulations, a 
fixed but randomly chosen constellation7 has been generated. 
The approach works for that case. A blue background depicts 
the presence of a repeater for the simulation. A raised flag 
indicates the detection.
Fig. 2  Sum of singular value-based detection of anomalies with noisy 
measurements (noise variance is 10 degree2)
Fig. 3  Sum of singular value-based detection of anomalies with noisy 
measurements (noise variance is 25 degree2)
6 For perfect (i.e., noiseless) measurements.
7 All satellites in view are above the receiver, i.e., their z-coordinate 
w.r.t. the ENU-frame centered around the receiver is positive.
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The results for more noisy measurements (a variance of 
25 degree2 ) is shown in Fig. 3. A reliable detection cannot 
be performed in that case, i.e., no threshold can be found 
to yield an acceptable misdetection and false alarm rate. 
The spoofer was turned on for the same time instances as in 
the previous simulation (indicated by the blue background 
again). The detection-flag is indicated in blue. It should be 
mentioned that the statistic not only depends on noise, but 
also on the current geometry, i.e. the satellite constellation 
and the direction of the spoofer/repeater.
5  Snapshot‑based attitude estimation
To summarize the results derived so far, the block diagram 
of the basic snapshot-based algorithm (depicted in Fig. 4) 
is presented. A quality metric based on the normalized sum 
of singular values q ∈ [0, 1] is computed by the algorithm:
A flag indicating spoofing sspo by comparing the sum with a 
certain threshold 휖 is returned as well:
(19)q = f (횺) = 1
N
3∑
k=1
휎k.
(20)sspo =
{
1 ∶ 0 ≤ q ≤ 𝜖
0 ∶ 𝜖 < q ≤ 1.
First, the performance is analyzed using simulated data 
sets. A random almanac consisting of N unit vectors is gen-
erated. Afterwards a random attitude is generated by choos-
ing a unit vector for the rotation axis and a scalar rotation 
angle randomly. The almanac unit vectors are then rotated by 
this attitude, yielding {bperf
k
}N
k=1
 . Finally, the measurements 
are generated by again generating a random rotation (with 
the constraint, that the rotation axis is orthogonal to bk).
Optionally a spoofer can be turned on for specified 
simulation runs. This will force all DoA estimates of the 
impinging signals to have the same azimuth and eleva-
tion, before noise is added. For the described examples, 
the affected simulations are the ones in the intervals 
[200, 400], [650, 800] and [1000, 1500].
5.1  Example 1: low noise with six signals
Figure 5 shows some exemplary results for 2000 subse-
quent runs using a noise variance of 5 degree2 and 6 refer-
ence angles. Figure 5 shows the same setup for only three 
Fig. 4  Block diagram of the basic snapshot-based algorithm (taken 
from [22])
Fig. 5  Difference to reference for roll, pitch and yaw in degree; the 
noise variance was 5 degree2 and N = 6
Fig. 6  Normalized singular values of C ; the noise variance was 5 
degree2 and N = 6
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almanac measurements. The runs where a spoofer was 
active are indicated by a blue background.
Figure 6 depicts the resulting normalized singular val-
ues for this example.
Figure 7 shows the resulting SVD-based metric and the 
detection flag.
5.2  Example 2: high noise with four signals
Again 2000 runs were performed using only 3 signals with 
a three times higher noise variance of 15 degree2 . Figure 8 
shows the resulting error of the attitude angles compared to 
the reference. The number of signals is too low to perform 
an estimate with such a big noise.
Figure 9 shows the corresponding singular values. When 
spoofing is active, the second and third singular value ( 휎2 
and 휎3 ) again almost vanish, but not completely, which is 
due to the noise.
As depicted in Fig. 10, spoofing detection is still almost 
always reliably possible. Only one mis-detection happened 
around epoch 800.
Fig. 7  Quality metric and returnd spoofing flag; the noise variance 
was 5 degree2 and N = 6
Fig. 8  Difference from reference for roll, pitch and yaw in degree; the 
noise variance was 15 degree2 and N = 3
Fig. 9  Normalized singular values of C ; the noise variance was 15 
degree2 and N = 3
Fig. 10  Quality metric and returned spoofing flag; the noise variance 
was 15 degree2 and N = 3
Fig. 11  Block diagram of the GNSS receiver test platform
14 M. Appel et al.
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6  Multi‑antenna GNSS receiver test platform
The detection methods shown in the previous paragraphs 
(Sect. 3) are implemented in a receiver platform. By using 
such a platform, the performance of the detection methods 
and algorithms can be evaluated and compared. A block 
diagram of the platform is depicted in Fig. 11. The following 
qualitative requirements are mandatory and therefore have to 
be taken into account during the design phase:
• Robustness against environmental conditions, i.e., salty 
air, is essential.
• The power consumption has to be low enough to record 
long enough.
• To avoid fire, the heat produced by the devices has to be 
acceptable.
• The downmixing has to be done for all channels synchro-
nously in parallel.
• A calibration signal is necessary to measure and therefore 
compensate different latencies of the cables connecting 
the antennas, that are in general not equal.
• Real-time processing and recording has to be done in 
parallel and therefore splitting of the signal in the IF-
domain is mandatory.
• All devices (i.e., mixers and AD-samplers) have to be 
synchronized using a common local oscillator frequency.
• The sampling rate needs to be high enough to capture the 
whole GPS L1 band.
• The storage (i.e., RAID-device) has to be fast and big 
enough to allow high bit resolutions of the sampler and 
several minutes of recording time.
A block diagram of the whole test equipment is depicted in 
Fig. 11. The details of the different parts are described in the 
following subsections.
An active antenna is used for reception. It includes low-
noise amplifiers and RF bandpass filters. For downmixing 
the GPS L1 frequency band (center frequency: 1.57542 
GHz) to an intermediate frequency, a front-end is used. It 
includes power supply for the amplifiers of the antenna, 
downmixers as well as a phase-locked loop frequency syn-
thesizer, which is fed by an external 10 MHz reference. The 
signal is split in the IF domain. One path is fed into the sam-
pling device. This is on custom of the shelf (COTS) hard-
ware capable of sampling up to 16 channels in parallel. The 
sampled data are further processed using DLR’s software 
receiver (MAGELLAN). The second path is fed into the 
real-time array receiver GALANT. Again COTS hardware 
is used as a basis to implement the receiver logic in both 
field programmable gate array (FPGA) and software. Parts 
requiring computational expensive operations (i.e., MACs: 
multiply and accumulate units) are implemented on the 
FPGA. Further details can be found in Refs. [32, 33]. Both 
the software and the real-time receiver’s generic structure 
are depicted in Fig. 1 in Sect. 2.
6.1  Antenna array
The system’s antenna is the first element of the processing 
chain. The 2 × 2 uniform rectangular array (URA) dual-
frequency antenna array provides 4 degrees of freedom 
(DOFs). The element spacing is approximately half the 
wavelength for both GPS L1 and Galileo E5a. The array is 
depicted in Fig. 12.
The array is the key-enabler for the whole system. To 
enable accurate DoA estimates, a calibration input is 
available to inject a calibration signal (patented, see [34]) 
Fig. 12  Picture of the dual-band 2 × 2 uniform rectangular array
Fig. 13  Picture of the opened single-frequency RF front-end (for E1/
L1), capable of downmixing up to nine channels in parallel
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synchronously into all patches. The interested reader can 
find further details in Ref. [35].
6.2  Front‑end
A single front-end (designed and manufactured by DLR) 
is capable of downmixing up to nine channels in parallel 
for a certain frequency (in that case GPS L1). The mixing 
is implemented following a superheterodyne principle. The 
frequency is derived by locking a phase-locked loop (PLL) 
to an external clock (10 MHz). The intermediate frequency 
is chosen to be 75 MHz. The signals are amplified using low-
noise amplifiers (LNAs) preserving a good signal-to-noise 
ratio (SNR). Another key element is a highly linear phase 
response of the IF-bandpass filter. In parallel, one synchro-
nous upmixing channel allows to translate the calibration 
signal from the IF to the HF-domain.
An opened front-end box is shown in Fig. 13.
A detailed description of the front-end design can be 
found in Ref. [35].
6.3  Sampling device
The sampling device is based on custom of the shelf (COTS) 
hardware from National Instruments (NI). The processing is 
customized, by modifying the software (LabView), which is 
executed on a NI PXIe-8135 Core i7 processor. Sampling is 
performed using the NI PXIe-5171R oscilloscope providing 
up to eight channels with a resolution of 14 bit and a sam-
pling rate of 250 MHz. Since the available signal bandwidth 
of the front-end is around 20 MHz, a downsampling to 100 
MHz is implemented before data storage. The operation is 
performed on an FPGA, which is also part of the device. 
This involves a bandpass undersampling mechanism. The 
signal’s intermediate frequency after sampling therefore is 
25 MHz in reverse frequency position. An external 10 MHz 
reference frequency is used for synchronization.
A storage device (NI HDD-8266 RAID with an overall 
capacity of 2 TB) is connected via an external PCIexpress 
interface. This allows a maximum storage time of around 25 
min for eight channels. The sampling device (top) and the 
RAID (bottom) is shown in Fig. 14.
6.4  Real‑time receiver platform (GALANT)
The digital part of the real-time receiver platform is again 
COTS hardware (PicoDigitzer 125). The whole device is 
clocked, using an external 10 MHz reference frequency. 16 
A/D converters have a sampling rate of 100 MHz, making 
the signal again visible at 25 MHz in reversed frequency 
position. The correlation is performed on the internal VIR-
TEX-6 FPGA, whereas computationally less heavy opera-
tions run on an Core i7 processor. The calibration signal is 
generated and transferred to the analog domain using one 
of the up to 8 D/A channels. This allows the calibration of 
different cable lengths of the reception channels.
The receiver is shown in Fig. 15 (together with an L1 and 
E5a front-end):
7  Experimental evaluation of the test 
platform
The experiments using the platform were performed in cal-
ender week 24 of 2016. The tests including repeaters have 
been performed on June 17th, 2016. To be able to transmit in 
the GPS L1 frequency band, special permission is required. 
DLR is authorized by the corresponding German Authority8 
to transmit these signals at certain locations (testbeds). For 
the campaign, the maritime jamming testbed in the Baltic 
sea (near Hiddensee) was chosen. The location is illustrated 
by the red circle in Fig. 16.
Fig. 14  Picture of the NI PXI System including the RAID storage
Fig. 15  Picture of the real-time receiver GALANT (including two 
frontends)
8 “Bundesnetzagentur”.
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7.1  Dynamic trajectory
Two ships were available to perform the experiments. The 
planned dynamic repeater scenario is shown in Fig. 17. The 
static “repeater” vessel (Wind Protector) is anchored and 
depicted in orange. The dynamic “receiver” vessel (Baltic 
Taucher II) is shown in blue.
7.2  Repeater‑vessel
A picture of the repeater installation is shown in Fig. 18. 
An aeronautical antenna was used for reception. After con-
ditioning of the signal (amplification), a horn antenna was 
installed for re-transmission. Due to export regulations, fur-
ther details of the repeater setup cannot be provided.
Fig. 16  Location of the jamming testbed, where the experiments have been performed
Fig. 17  Planned trajectory for the dynamic scenario
Fig. 18  Repeater installation on the transmission-vessel
Fig. 19  Receiver vessel: the test platforms array antenna is depicted 
on the left and the ship’s navigation system’s antenna on the right
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7.3  Receiver‑vessel
The system described in Sect. 5 was installed on the receiver-
vessel. The antennas have been mounted on the mast to avoid 
multipath effects caused by reflections on the metal parts of 
the ship. A picture is shown in Fig. 19.
7.4  Board instruments
By inspecting the board instruments, the effect on ship’s 
navigation systems was used as an indicator for “success” 
of the repeater attack. An example of a successful experi-
ment is shown in Fig. 20. The red line indicates the ground 
truth. During the attack, the position reported by the receiver 
vessel (circle) was almost the repeater vessel’s one (Wind 
Protector, shown in green).
7.5  Real‑time results
The algorithm depicted in Fig. 4 in Sect. 4 was imple-
mented on the real-time receiver GALANT, described in 
Sect. 5. The processing result is sent to the graphical user 
interface including the “spoofing flag”. In Fig. 21, the 
presence of a spoofer/repeater is clearly indicated.
7.6  Post‑processing results
During the scenario, data were collected using the sam-
pling device described in Sect. 5. The sampled data were 
fed into DLR’s software receiver. The previously described 
attitude estimation algorithm delivers the platform’s atti-
tude together with the quality metric. A threshold of 0.985 
was chosen for spoofing detection. This has been done 
by inspection, since not  enough samples are available 
Fig. 20  Board instruments visualizing a successful repeater attack
Fig. 21  Screenshot of the 
graphical user interface of the 
GALANT receiver, indicat-
ing the presence of a spoofer/
repeater
Fig. 22  Post-processing result of the attitude quality used for indicat-
ing the presence of a repeater
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to derive and setup a clean statistical test. The result is 
depicted in Fig. 22.
The blue line shows the snapshot-based calculation 
of the singular value-based quality metric for every sec-
ond. Caused by the noise added by the amplifiers of the 
repeater, the DoA estimates are fluctuating. Therefore, 
the quality metric q is fluctuating as well. This does not 
allow to find a proper threshold. Smoothing over a window 
of size w was implemented to compensate for this effect. 
Windows of size w = 10 (red line) and w = 20 (magenta 
line) are shown in Fig. 22.
A zoomed version of the plot is shown in Fig.  23. 
Smoothing allows for a more robust detection. The price for 
this is an increase in the possible time to detection of a few 
fractionals of a second as indicated in the plot.
For the spoofer/repeater being able to capture the receiv-
er’s tracking loops (both implementations have been para-
metrized similarly), the distance between the repeater and 
victim receiver, the amplification of the repeater as well 
as the noise figure of the repeater’s amplifiers are the key 
parameters (see [36] for instance). However, once the loops 
are captured, the only thing that matters for detection is the 
estimated direction of arrival for the different impinging 
signals.
8  Summary and conclusion
In this work, an algorithm capable of simultaneously com-
puting an array receiver’s attitude and providing a spoofing 
detection was presented. The performed experimental vali-
dation was described. The algorithm is based on direction 
of arrival measurements from the corresponding satellites. 
First, by using computer simulations, the performance of the 
algorithm was demonstrated. The platform utilized for real-
time and post-processing was introduced. Finally, an experi-
ment using the aforementioned platform was described, 
before the vulnerability of the state of the art as well the 
detection capabilities of the platform have been evaluated. 
Furthermore, the robustness of detection was increased by 
smoothing the returned quality metric. However, the time to 
detection is increased.
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